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ABSTRACT 
Macroeconomic policies have many goals like low inflation, high economic growth, 
balance of payment equilibrium etc. Since the monetary policy has more flexible 
framework and exerts its effect with long and variable lags, it has certain advantages 
over fiscal policy. The issue with the monetary policy is that as it is widely accepted 
today, the central banks can only control inflation rates in the long run. In 1990’s, 
after the failure of monetary and nominal exchange rate targeting to reduce inflation 
rates, Inflation Targeting (IT) is implemented successfully in some developed 
countries, which encouraged developing and transition countries fighting against the 
high inflation rates. In this paper, the applicability and prerequisites of IT in 
developing countries will be discussed.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
One of the consensus views among economists is importance 
of low and stable inflation. Economic theory assures us low and 
stable inflation is important for market-driven growth, and that 
monetary policy is the most direct tool for controlling inflation. Further, 
among all of the government’s tools for influencing and directing the 
economy, monetary policy has proven to be the most flexible 
instrument for achieving medium-term stabilization objectives. 
In 1970’s, policy-makers and most economists supported 
‘‘activist’’ monetary policies, which were defined as policies whose 
purpose was to keep output and unemployment close to their ‘‘full 
employment’’ levels at all times. Supporters of activism believed that 
there was long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, 
known as Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958; Samuelson and Solow, 1960). 
According to this view, the monetary authorities could maintain a 
permanently lower rate of unemployment by accepting some degree 
of inflation.  Actively managed monetary (and fiscal) policies could be 
used to maintain maximum employment pretty much all the time. 
However, the activist monetary policies of the 1970s and 1980s not 
only failed to deliver their promised benefits, but also they helped to   3
generate inflationary pressures that could be subdued only at high 
economic cost. 
Today, many economists and practitioners accept the primary 
goal of monetary policy is attaining and preserving the price stability. 
The reasons for this agreement can be explained thorough four 
reasons: 
1)  An increase in the money supply does not have any 
impact on the real side of the economy in the long run, although it has 
some temporary effects in the short run. However, the mechanism 
through which the effects manifest themselves and the time when 
they will be seen is not clearly known beforehand. 
2)  Inflation has very undesirable impacts on the economic 
growth and resource allocations. 
3)  The effect of monetary policy on the rate of inflation can 
be observed with long and variable lags due to the aggregate 
demand and supply shocks, instability of the intermediate targets etc. 
and these lags makes difficult to control inflation on a period-by-
period basis by the central banks.  
4)  It is accepted that due to the dynamic inconsistency 
problem, there must be some restrictions on the central bank activity. 
Pressures of politicians or the private sector on central banks to 
stimulate the economic activity may result in the price instability. In 
the inflation targeting regime, the commitment of central banks to 
achieve low and stable inflation environment, impedes these 
pressures and help central banks to focus on the inflation objectives,   4
not growth etc. The regime gives also chances to take pre-emptive 
actions as soon as some signals are shown.
1 
To implement a successful monetary policy, restrictions on the 
policy-making processes are sometimes needed especially in 
developing countries to discipline the policymaking process and to 
make policy more transparent because of the time-inconsistency 
problem.
2  
For these reasons, conducting the policy by using a nominal 
anchor may be helpful. Although some of the nominal anchors result 
in the loss of independent monetary policy, when the developing 
markets are considered, it can be argued that the loss of the 
developing countries because of not conducting independent 
monetary polices are less than their gains of discretionary monetary 
policy.  
In this paper, other nominal anchors will be examined then the 
general aspects of IT regime will be discussed. After analyzing the 
common features of IT regime in the developed countries and the 
scope for IT in the developing countries with country experiences willl 





                                                 
1 This argument is not as commonly accepted as the first three arguments. 
2 In the short- run, policymakers have some incentives to implement overly 
expansionary monetary policy and to increase the rate of inflation to a rate, which is 
higher than the expected rate by public. When most of the input costs are fixed in the 
short-run, higher inflation rate reduces real production costs and increases real 
activity temporarily until the economic agents reflect this increase to the input prices.   5
II. ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICY REGIMES 
II.1 Exchange Rate Targeting 
Targeting the exchange rate is a monetary policy regime with a 
long history. For a given country, particularly small country
3, fixing the 
exchange rate of its currency to that of large, low inflation country is 
one of the methods to reduce inflation and keep it low. Due to its 
simple and easily understood framework, exchange rate targeting has 
gained popularity between the developed and developing countries in 
the past. It has several advantages, some of which can be 
summarized as follows: It fixes the inflation rate for internationally 
traded goods, and thus directly contributes to keep inflation under 
control, it anchors inflation expectations and by providing an 
automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy
4, it avoids the time-
inconsistency problem. 
Although exchange rate targeting have helped even some 
developed countries to control their inflation rates like France and the 
United Kingdom, international experiences display that it has also 
some problems. In the developing countries, it may have much more 
dangerous results than that in the industrialized countries. Because in 
the developing countries the depreciation of the domestic currencies 
results in the deterioration of the balance sheets and increase in the 
inflation expectations due to their long inflation history. 
The problem with the exchange rate targeting regimes can be 
listed as follows: First of all, exchange rate targeting prevents central 
                                                 
3 Because, for some countries or block of countries like the United States, Japan and 
European Monetary Union, there is no obvious country whose currency can serve as 
the nominal anchor.   
4 When the possibility of depreciation of domestic currency occurs, tight monetary 
policy and when that of appreciation occurs, loose monetary policy will be 
implemented.   6
banks from conducting independent monetary policy. The central 
banks are no more able to respond shocks which hit the economy 
and which could be reversed or eased by some monetary policy 
actions. Furthermore, shocks to the anchor country are directly 
transmitted to the targeting country. However, because of lack of 
independence of the central banks and possible political pressures on 
the central banks, it is very difficult to conduct discretionary monetary 
policy in many developing countries successfully.  
Secondly, exchange rate targeting is likely to promote financial 
fragility in emerging market countries. Because of uncertainty about 
the value of the domestic currency, it is easier to issue debt for 
nonfinancial firms, banks, governments in terms of foreign currency in 
these countries and exchange rate targeting may further increase this 
tendency. When there is an unanticipated depreciation or devaluation 
of domestic currency, the balance sheets of firms and banks are 
damaged very seriously because, in most of the developing countries, 
the weight of foreign currency denominated debt is higher than the 
weight of foreign currency denominated assets on their balance 
sheets and this increases their debt burdens. The deterioration of 
these balance sheets cause moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems and finally results in the decline in the economic growth. 
Third disadvantage of the exchange rate targeting in emerging 
market countries is that although it is initially successful in bringing 
inflation down, a successful speculative attack can lead to a 
resurgence of inflation. Due to the lack of credibility of the central 
banks in many emerging market countries, a sharp depreciation of 
the currency after the speculative attack can lead to rise in actual and 
expected inflation. A rise in the expected inflation results in a sharp 
rise in interest rates, which weakens the cash flows of the firms and   7
cause to a deterioration of the balance sheets and deepen the 
financial crisis.  
Fourth disadvantage is that exchange rate targeting cause a 
decline in the risk for foreign investors by providing more stable value 
of currency and this might cause excessive lending. When the bank 
supervisory is weak and there is full deposits insurance coverage 
given by the government, this excess capital inflow might result in the 
deterioration of the banks’ balance sheets as a result of moral hazard, 
which has very unfavorable impacts on the economy. 
Another disadvantage of exchange rate targeting is that it can 
weaken the accountability of the policymakers. Because in many 
emerging market countries, the daily fluctuations of the exchange 
rates can provide an early warning signal that monetary policy is 
overly expansionary and the fear of depreciation can make overly 
expansionary policy less likely. Targeting the exchange rate removes 
this early warning signal and thus gives incentives to central banks to 
pursue overly expansionary policies. 
In many developing countries, it is sometimes argued that 
currency board implementation may be more successful because 
strong commitment to fix the exchange rate contributes to increase 
the credibility of the central banks, which is exactly what they need. 
However, currency board application has also some problems.  
II.2 Monetary Targeting 
Another nominal anchor, which can be used in the conduct of 
monetary policy to tie down the public’s expectations, is monetary 
aggregates. Monetary targeting has some advantages when it is 
compared with the exchange rate targeting: In the case of monetary 
targeting, authorities are able to respond to shocks to the domestic   8
economy, which is not possible in the exchange-rate targeting case, 
as explained above. However, it is more likely that in the case of 
exchange rate targeting, the transparency and clarity of the policy is 
much more than that of the monetary targeting. In any case, 
monetary target sends immediate signals about the stance of the 
monetary policy and consistency of the stance with the monetary 
target and the intentions of the policymakers. In monetary targeting 
strategy, the monetary authority’s choice of inflation targets may differ 
from that of any other country. Monetary target also prevents policy 
makers from falling into time inconsistency trap. Due to these 
advantages, in the 1970’s, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
regime, many countries started to conduct their monetary policies by 
using monetary nominal anchors. 
Despite all of these advantages, the success of the monetary 
targeting is dependent on two preconditions. First, the targeted 
monetary aggregate must be under the control of the central bank. 
That is, this aggregate has to be influenced by the central bank 
operations. Second, there must be strong relationship between the 
goal and the target variable. If there is no stable relationship between 
income level, price level and the velocity of money, monetary targets 
will not be able to send clear signals about the stance of the monetary 
policy and achieving the monetary targets will not be very meaningful 
in terms of reaching the ultimate goal of central banks.
5 
By the early 1980s, when it was understood that the 
relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation and nominal 
                                                 
5 For these reasons, no monetary targeting central bank has ever been so strict in 
their implementations; instead, most of the time they have been flexible due to the 
some short-run considerations like output growth and exchange rate (like Germany 
and Swiss). 
   9
income had broken down and most of the countries like the United 
States, and the United Kingdom formally abandoned monetary 
targeting. 
II.3 Inflation Targeting 
In the 1990s increasing number of industrialized countries 
started to implement inflation targeting framework (IT) as a result of 
the poor performance of other nominal anchors like exchange rate 
targeting or monetary targeting in meeting the objectives of the 
central banks. After successful results of IT in developed countries 
some developing countries like Brazil, Chile, Chezch Republic, 
Poland started to implement IT regime.  
What is IT? 
Some common features of IT implementation as specified in 
Mishkin (2000): 
1)  To announce the public a medium term numerical 
targets for inflation. 
2)  To commit to the public that the price stability is the 
primary goal of monetary policy. 
3)  To use all available information not just monetary 
aggregates or exchange rates in policy setting. 
4)  To increase transparency, as a result of the continuous 
communication with the public and markets about the plans, 
objectives, and decisions of the monetary policy. 
5)  To increase the accountability of the central bank for 
attaining its inflation objectives.   10
The important point here is that the IT is not only the 
announcement of the numerical target for inflation. This point is 
crucial for especially developing countries because the policymakers 
of these countries sometimes report numerical targets for inflation. 
This does not imply that these countries implement IT regimes. The 
IT regime requires also the other four features as explained above. 
The Advantages of IT: 
The IT regime has several advantages as a monetary policy 
strategy when compared with the other policy regimes. 
1)  IT provides a nominal anchor for monetary policy and 
inflation expectations. 
2)  In contrast to the exchange rate targeting, IT gives 
opportunity to respond shocks hitting to the economy and to focus 
domestic considerations  
3)    IT does not require a stable relationship between 
monetary aggregates and inflation as in monetary targeting. It uses all 
available information in the formation of the policy setting.  
4)  As it is explained above, monetary policy shows its 
impact on the economic activity with long and variable lags. IT regime 
gives an explicit role to the lags of monetary policy in the choice of 
policy instruments.  
5)  It is possible in the IT regime to decrease the possibility 
of falling into time inconsistency trap by decreasing the pressure 
coming from the politicians in order to stimulate the economic 
activity.
6 
                                                 
6 A strong institutional commitment to make the price stability the primary goal of the 
monetary policy is necessary for IT to reach these results and it is necessarily 
important for developing countries, which have often had policy misalignment in the 
past.   11
6)  The other advantage of the IT regime is its great 
emphasis on the regular communication with the public and 
transparency. This property have important role in the success of the 
IT in the industrialized countries. The policymakers in the developed 
countries use every opportunity to communicate with the public like 
public speeches and a step further by means of inflation reports. 
7)  Transparency of the policy has inclination to make the 
policy more accountable to the public and continuous success of the 
policy in reaching to numerical targets increases the public support 
for the central bank.  
8)  One of the advantages of IT regime is its clarity for 
public understanding compared with the nominal income targeting. In 
the nominal income-targeting regime, there is no decomposition for 
the income component and price component. So, it might be difficult 
for the public to built price expectations. In addition, the inflation-
targeting regime serves as an anchor for wage and the price setters 
and the existence of such an anchor increases the credibility of the 
policy.  
The Disadvantages of IT: 
1)  The inflation-targeting regime has been criticized due 
to its overemphasis on inflation, its rigid structure, its negative 
impacts on the economic growth and its exclusion other goals like 
output stabilization.
7 However, the countries’ announcement of the 
targets above the zero inflation rates reflects the fact that the central 
banks does not ignore the output growths totally and it takes into 
account a possible deflation and the undesirable impacts of deflation 
on the economic activity.  
                                                 
7 The detail of this discussion is explained in the Annex1   12
2)  It is claimed that there is only weak central bank 
accountability in IT because in contrast to exchange rate and 
monetary aggregates, inflation is difficult to control and the policy 
instruments show their impact on inflation with long and variable lags. 
This problem is especially severe in the developing countries when 
the rates of inflation are being brought down from high levels. In this 
situation, there will be large forecast errors and frequent target 
misses. Therefore, it will be difficult for the central bank to explain the 
reason for the deviations from the target and to gain credibility, which 
is central to the IT regime. According to Masson etc. (1997) IT will be 
more effective if it is started to implement this regime after successful 
disinflation. Another factor that has influence on the ability of the 
central banks to control inflation is the large existence of the 
government-controlled prices and this factor is of significant 
importance for the developing countries. Successful IT 
implementation requires high coordination between the people who 
determine these prices and the monetary policymakers or the 
exclusion of these prices from the targeted rate in this circumstance. 
Moreover, inflation forecasting procedure in these countries should 
take into account the timing and magnitude of the changes in those 
prices.  
3)  IT may not prevent fiscal dominance. In the long run, 
large fiscal deficits will cause either monetization of the deficits or 
devaluation and they will result in high inflation. 
4)  Exchange rate flexibility required by IT might cause 
financial instability. 
5)  There are some economists (e.g. Calvo 1999b, Calvo 
and Mendoza 2000) who argue that the IT regime is too discretionary 
and it may cause policy makers to follow overly expansionary   13
policies. However, as it is explained in this paper, IT regime increases 
the accountability and transparency of the policy. Accountability 
increases the costs of policy mistakes for policy makers and 
transparency makes difficult to conduct overly expansionary policy 
without it being noticed. So, it does not seem plausible to assert that 
the monetary policy in the IT regime is too discretionary.  
6)  Some economists argue that IT is too rigid and it 
impedes the monetary authorities from responding to the shocks 
hitting the economy. However, it can be argued that IT is far from 
being a rigid rule; it can be evaluated as ‘constraint discretion’.
8 It 
does not impose simple rules about the conduct of the monetary 
policy. Contrary to simple rules, IT regime obligates policy makers to 
use all available information in order to achieve the target.   
II.3.1 Conceptual Framework 
1)  Assignment of the target 
The authorities that announce the target differ across the 
countries and also it depends on the central bank’s instrumental 
independence. The target is announced in some countries by the 
central bank (Australia, Sweden), in the others, by the Ministry of 
Finance and the Governor of the central bank (Canada and New 
Zealand). To improve the credibility, it would be better that the central 
bank and the Ministry of Finance work together; here the government 
makes decision about the goal of the monetary policy and gives the 
responsibility and tools to the central bank for attaining it. (See Israeli 
experience in the paper) 
 
                                                 
8 See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)   14
 2) The interaction with the other policy goals 
In an IT regime the overriding objective of the monetary policy is 
to achieve the specified inflation target and then maintain the price 
stability. The goals other than inflation will not be pursued in the 
inflation-targeting regime when they are inconsistent with the inflation 
objective. The fixed exchange rate regimes are not consistent with IT 
regime, since IT regime necessarily requires exchange rate flexibility. 
Because, especially for the developing countries, fixed exchange rate 
is susceptible under limited foreign exchange reserves and a 
persistent domestic-foreign inflation differential in a world of capital 
mobility.
9  
However, it is possible for IT implementing central banks to 
have any other goals, which are consistent with the inflation target. A 
full employment goal is not inconsistent with the inflation target. 
Although there is a short-run trade-off between these two objectives, 
in the long run the contribution of low and stable inflation to growth is 
certain.  
Central banks can pursue the goal of financial stability as well in 
IT regime. This condition is not always inconsistent with the IT 
framework. However, the fragility in the banking sector may decrease 
interest rate flexibility. In the short run, the tight monetary policies 
followed by the central banks in order to reach the inflation target may 
threaten the financial institutions. In the long run, the crisis in the 
banking sector may result in the deflation and these causes 
undershoot of the target.  
 
                                                 
9 According to Arrau etc. (1995), the flexible exchange rate regimes in the developing 
countries did not result in lower weights to the exchange rates given in the policy 
decision process.   15
3)  Definition of the target 
The general characteristic of an IT regime is determined by the 
horizon of the target, the level of the target and the specification in 
terms of a point or a band and the choice of price index. 
3a) Horizon of the target 
The horizon of the target is affected by the initial inflation rate. 
When there is a difference between the targeted rate and actual rate, 
the central banks implement a disinflation program
10 process in order 
to diminish gradually the inflation rate to the desired level. Horizon of 
the target is also affected by the ability of the central bank to offset 
the effects of the supply shocks and the type of the IT regime 
implemented by central bank, strict or flexible (see annex1).   
3b) Level of the target 
Due to the upward bias
11 included in the measurement of the 
CPI, it is common between inflation targeting countries to determine 
the target above zero percentages. These biases arise from the 
adjustment of the consumers to relative price changes by substituting 
similar goods with lower prices. Another reason is the quality bias; the 
price rises due to the improved quality should not be counted as 
inflation.  
Some economic risks also support the non-zero inflation target. 
Firstly, when the nominal wages are rigid downward, real wages will 
not fall in response to decreasing labor demand. So, this will cause 
an increase of the unemployment rate. Secondly, too low inflation 
                                                 
10 In Canada and New Zealand, the inflation targets were used to assist the 
disinflationary process. 
11 Although there is a bias in the measurement of the CPI, the use of IT or variants of 
CPI as a targeted variable comprises some practical advantages like familiarity, 
ready availibity, and convenience in the communications with the public.     16
rates bringing about too low nominal interest rates
11 will prevent the 
central bank to decrease interest rates in case of a recession.   
In most of the developing countries, there is no consensus 
about the optimal inflation rate for their economy. The lack of 
consensus on a numerical value makes the choice of targeted 
variable’s nature arbitrary. However, there seems to be a general 
presumption that developing countries should probably aim at 
attaining a medium term rate of inflation that is somewhat higher than 
that of industrial countries (say between 4 and 8 percent per year), 
and is allowed to fluctuate within a somewhat wider band to help 
accommodate larger supply shocks. (Masson etc. 1997) 
3c) Choice of the price index 
For the transparency of an IT regime, the public should be 
familiar with the price level to be targeted. Besides, the definition of a 
price index also results in the credibility and flexibility trade-off. The 
reason why central bankers may be interested in choosing a core 
index is that to exclude the first-round effects of non-monetary 
determinants of inflation. In New Zealand, some certain events, like a 
change in indirect taxes, a natural disasters etc., are beforehand 
declared to be excluded from the targeted index. However, this 
includes the risk of an increase in the output variability. When there is 
a focus on a core index, the policymaker might not care about the 
first-round effects on prices by causing a contraction in the economic 
activity and might only consider whether it causes a rise in inflation 
expectations or not. Targeting the core index may cause another 
problem. When all the price and wages in the economy are indexed 
on the headline index, their responses to the movements in this index 
                                                 
11 Nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero.   17
will be captured by the underlying rate. If the core index is used, it is 
very important that the public is well informed about the specification 
of the index. 
3d) Width of the target band 
One of the subjects, which should be determined under the 
inflation-targeting framework, is to decide whether point or band 
target will be made. Since monetary policy shows its impact on 
inflation with long and variable lags and it is not possible to predict the 
future inflation rate exactly, inflation rate will display variability. In 
these conditions, the adoption of the wider bandwidth will also gives 
some scope for output stabilization. However, it should be known that 
as the time passes and the positive results of the regime is realized 
by the public, the inflation-targeting regime might decrease these 
irreducible variability in inflation and the adoption of the band regime, 
which is both believable and attainable regime, decreases the 
variability of the output. The adoption of point target brings credibility 
to the implementation. However, the existence of the unpredicted 
events and the nature of the inflation makes difficult to reach to the 
point target. The implementation of the band decreases the credibility 
of the policy, which is especially difficult to build in the developing 
countries. 
4) Accountability 
IT increases the accountability of the policy by increasing the 
transparency. The strongest case of accountability of a central bank 
in the IT regime is the New Zealand where the government has the 
right to dismiss the governor of the central bank when there is a 
divergence from the target, even for one quarter. 
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5) Inflation  forecasts 
In the IT regime, the inflation forecasts has special role. 
Monetary authorities use inflation forecasts in policymaking process. 
When a difference between expected and targeted rates realizes, 
monetary authorities takes pre-emptive actions in order to eliminate 
this difference. Therefore, it is very important in the IT regime to 
develop powerful models that explains the dynamics of the economy 
well.  
Actually, the different characteristic of the IT regime from the 
other policy regimes stems from this point. In the IT regime, the 
important point is not the accuracy of these forecasts, but the 
emphasis given to the forecasts in the policymaking process in the IT 
regime, rather than past or current inflation developments.  
II.3.2 Prerequisites and defining features of IT 
Firstly, the central banks should have independence in the 
conduct of monetary policy. The independence here does not imply 
the full independence, but at least instrumental independence. The 
importance of this precondition increases when the developing 
countries considered. Actually, fiscal dominance and poor financial 
market structure constrain the scope for an independent monetary 
policy in these countries. A comprehensive reform program, which 
decreases the pressures of the public sector on the financial sector, 
and inflation to low levels, including banking sector regulations, is 
required in order to create the central bank independence in those 
countries. To meet this requirement, the fiscal policy should not have 
excess pressures on the monetary policy stance. That is, the central 
banks do not have to conduct accommodative policies. The weights 
of public sector borrowing requirements on the financial system must   19
not be so high and there should not be direct borrowing of public 
sector from the central bank and heavy reliance on the seignorage 
revenues by the public sector. If these conditions are not satisfied, 
then the inflation will have fiscal roots and fiscally driven inflation 
process undermines effectiveness of monetary policy. Although there 
is no any consensus about the threshold at which monetary policy 
loses its effectiveness, it is generally accepted that the 15-25 percent 
inflation for three or five consecutive years will decrease the ability of 
the central bank to be successful in targeting some variables and 
lasting reduction in the inflation on its own. 
Secondly, there should not be another targeted nominal 
variable like wages or nominal exchange rate for successful 
implementation of IT regime. When the central bank commits to fix 
the nominal exchange rate to the currency of the main trading 
partner, the policymaker accepts that the rate of inflation of the major 
trading partner is the targeted inflation rate. In this case, it is not 
possible to conduct monetary policy by targeting any other variables 
especially in the existence of the capital mobility. In the softer version 
of the exchange rate targeting regime, like crawling peg, it may be 
possible to pursue other nominal objectives. However, it may be 
problematic. When there is a conflict between the objectives, the 
priority will be given to which target? For successful implementation 
of IT, the priority must be given to inflation objective. But, it is not 
possible to explain the priorities of the policymaker to the public in a 
credible manner before that conflict arises. In that case, the public will 
make their own comments about the policy actions and there is no 
guarantee that the policy stance will give the exact signals about the 
actions and will cause true comments. In order to circumvent those   20
problems, it would be better not to object other variables in the IT 
regimes. 
Thirdly, the presence of the lags in affecting the inflation by the 
monetary policy means that the optimal policy corresponds to inflation 
forecast targeting. Therefore, monetary authorities must be able to 
model inflation dynamics in the country and to forecast the inflation in 
IT regime and they should be certain about how monetary policy 
affects the macroeconomic variables, and about how the relative 
effectiveness of the policy instruments is. 
In order to implement an IT regime, a country that satisfies 
these above conditions should conduct a monetary policy, which has 
four basic elements. First of all, an explicit quantitative target must be 
announced for some periods. Secondly, the central bank has to show 
its intention that its most important objective is to enable an 
environment with stable prices to the public. Thirdly, the central bank 
should have powerful models, which reflects the economic dynamics 
well and makes the central bank be able to take pre-emptive actions, 
when it is necessary. Finally, since the influence of the monetary 
policy on the macroeconomic variables can be seen with long and 
variable lags, the central bank must have forward-looking behaviors 
by using the inflation forecasts as intermediate target. 
II.3.3 IT in developed countries 
At the beginning of the 1990’s, some countries like New 
Zealand, Canada, The United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Australia 
and Spain, started to implement the inflation-targeting regime. The IT 
implementation in these countries has some common features, which 
must be stressed here.   21
1)  In these countries, there was high degree of the exchange 
rate flexibility. Actually, some of the countries like the UK, Sweden, 
and Finland, had started to implement the IT regime after the failure 
of exchange rate targeting as a main anchor of the monetary policy.  
2)  The countries adopted IT, had the central bank 
independence at least in terms of the instrument independence and 
absence of fiscal dominance. 
3)  The central banks of these countries used the short-term 
interest rates as an instrument in their operations and they have well 
developed financial markets, which transmits effects of the policy 
actions to aggregate demand and inflation.  
4)  The targets are set in the forward-looking manner in order 
to offset the effects of foreseeable shocks on the inflation. 
5)  In the developed countries IT was used in order to built the 
credibility of the macroeconomic policy. In some countries, ministry of 
finance and the governor of the central bank announced the targets 
jointly and it eliminates the idea that there may be conflicts between 
the objectives of the economic policy objectives. The continuous 
communication with the public through the speeches and some 
publication like to inflation reports explain to the public what are the 
aims of the monetary policy implementation. When the IT framework 
is credible, it is possible to affect the expectations of the public.  
6)  The regime did not implemented in the high inflation 
environments, but low inflation environments, less than 10 percent 
and it helped to build the initial credibility in the first phases of the 
implementation. 
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II.3.4 IT in the developing countries 
The important question, which can be asked at this stage, is 
whether IT regime can be implemented in the developing countries, 
whether the necessary conditions for its success are satisfied or not. 
II.3.4.1 Scope for independent monetary policy in 
developing countries 
The major determinants of the independent monetary policy
12 
are that the degree of the fiscal dominance, and the absence of any 
firm commitment to target other nominal variables like exchange rates 
or monetary aggregates that might create some conflicts with the 
inflation objectives. 
In some of the developing countries it is readily apparent that 
these prerequisites are not satisfied. In countries experiencing high 
inflation, above 30- 40 percent per year for a number of years, the 
nominal variables will tend to show high degree of inertia and the 
monetary policy will be accommodative. In these conditions, the 
effects of monetary policy on inflation will be unpredictable and short-
lived. The most important step to be taken by the policymaker here is 
to decrease the inflation rates continuously, which requires to 
implement a stabilization program by decreasing the role of the 
central banks in the finance of the government deficits, to use some 
nominal anchors in order to shape the inflation expectations, 
consistent with the inflation objectives.  
However, for some developing countries, it is difficult to assess 
whether they satisfy these prerequisites or not. Fiscal dominance 
does not always result in high inflation, the extent to which monetary 
policy accommodates the other variables and the nature of the 
                                                 
12 One of the preconditions for the conduct of successful IT regimes.   23
shocks in the economy depends on a lot of country specific factors 
and the implementation of middle road exchange rate regimes like 
managed float and crawling peg systems gives discretion to the 
monetary authorities in ranking their external and domestic objectives 
in less-than-fully transparent manner.  
It is difficult for developing countries to claim that these 
countries have the same environment with the developing countries in 
terms of central bank independence. Central banks scope for the 
conduct of independent monetary policy is hindered by the presence 
of the three related factors in those countries: heavy reliance of the 
seignorage, shallow capital markets, fragile banking systems. 
The reliance on seignorage, which is the most common 
indicator of the fiscal dominance, is much heavier in developing 
countries than in the developed countries
13 due to a number of 
structural factors such as unstable tax revenues, poor tax collection 
procedures, skewed income distributions, political instability. In 
addition to these factors, it is claimed that in these countries there is a 
tendency to abuse this source of revenue in the crisis times. (Easterly 
etc. (1994)) 
The other indicator of fiscal dominance in these countries is the 
existence of shallow capital markets. A two-way relationship can be 
seen here. Sometimes, the undeveloped capital markets are the 
reasons for the fiscal dominance and sometimes the fiscal dominance 
is the reason for the undeveloped capital markets. The financial 
repressions to extract revenues from the financial system through the 
high reserve requirements, implementation of the sectoral credit 
policies and the compulsory requirements of the public debt and the 
                                                 
13 The annual recourse to seignorage in developing countries is ranges from 1.4 to 3 
percent of GDP, in advanced economies; it is below the one percent of GDP.   24
interest rates ceiling can be seen as an example of the fiscal 
dominance as being the reason for the undeveloped capital markets. 
On the other hand, in some instances, the access of the developing 
countries to the international capital markets is very low, the general 
wealth level is low compared with the developed countries and the 
degree of fiscal flexibility is low and these cause the government to 
rely on the seignorage revenues and other forms of repression in 
order to close the transitory gap between its revenue and the 
expenditure flows.  
A fragile banking system is another consequence of the long 
financial repression periods. After the financial sector reforms, 
banking sector introduce an independent influence on the conduct of 
monetary policy. The conflict between the objectives of price stability 
and attaining and preserving banking sector profitability is important 
in this context. Therefore, it is important for central banks to rank 
policy objectives. (See Masson etc. 1997) 
III. Country Cases 
In this part, some of the developing country cases will be 
examined. 
TABLE I: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR IT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
  CHILE ISRAEL  POLAND 
First Announcement  1990 1991  1998 
First Inflation Target  15-20% 14-15%  9,5% 
Target for 2000  3,5%  3-4%  below 4% 
Long-term Target  2-4% for 11 years  3-4% for 9 years  4% for 4 years 
Price Index  CPI CPI  CPI 
Target Horizon  2001-… 2000-2001  1999-2003 
Source: Morandé ,Schmidt-Hebbel, 1999; Bufman, Leiderman, 1999 ; Bank of Israel; 
National Bank of Poland   25
III.1 Israeli Experience 
In 1985, Israel, suffering from the hyperinflation with a fiscal 
deficit of 14 percent of GDP caused mainly by the costs of the war 
adopted an exchange rate based stabilization program which had 
strong adjustment of fiscal fundamentals, restrictions on wages and 
selected prices. First year, exchange rate was fixed against US dollar 
and after against a basket of G5 countries’ currencies. 
 
GRAPH I: 





































































      Source: IFS 
After that stabilization program, until 1991 the rate of inflation 
stayed in the range of 16-20 percent per year. However in this period, 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate influenced negatively 
Israel’s foreign trade.  So, in 1987 a devaluation of shekel occurred 
which was followed by the devaluations in June 1989, March 1990, 
September 1990 and April 1991. At the beginning of 1989 an 
exchange rate band of 3 percent was announced. The band’s width 
was enlarged to 5 percent in March 1990 to deal with international 
capital flows. Although the band’s width was getting larger, the 
speculative attacks against shekel didn’t stop. There are two major 
problems with this exchange rate policy; first the fixed exchange rate   26
is susceptible under limited foreign exchange reserves and a 
persistent domestic-foreign inflation differential in a world of capital 
mobility. Second, the adjustment of real exchange rate to financial 
and real shocks is delayed by the fixed range of the nominal 
exchange rate. So, in December 1991 it was decided that the slope of 
the pre-announced rate of crawl of the central parity for a given year 
would be approximately equal to the difference between the 
authorities’ inflation target for that year and a forecast of the average 
inflation rate for Israel’s main trading partners. This is how the 
inflation target became a goal of policy. (Bufman et al., 1995) The 
Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel gaining credibility with the 
stabilization program and independence by stopping financing the 
government deficit in 1985, made this decision jointly. In the period of 
crawling exchange rate band from 1992 to 1996, inflation rate 
declined to 10 percent per year on average.  
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Israel’s inflation targeting experience is different from other 
countries’ experience because there were still high rates of inflation in 
1991 when it was adopted and official targets for inflation and the   27
exchange rate were set simultaneously. Also, there were only the 
New Zealand IT experience of two years and Canada’s experience of 
ten months for an IT example for Israel.  
Inflation target is based on all-item CPI in Israel. Because the 
volatile prices of fruits and vegetables, mortgage interest costs 
constitute about 40 percent of the CPI and especially financial and 
wage contracts are indexed to all-item CPI in Israel. This is why 
Israeli people learn to live with high rates of inflation. 
For the year 1992, the inflation target and the rate of crawl of 
the exchange rate were set equal to 14-15 percent and 9 percent 
respectively. Narrow bands or point target should be preferable 
because financial markets and the public will focus on the upper limit 
of the band. On the other hand, setting a point target would be 
incredible in case of shocks that are more harmful for developing 
countries and also this makes the control over inflation more fragile.  
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There is no official inflation forecast of Bank of Israel, instead 
they use market based inflation expectations, which are determined 
as the interest rate differential between nominal and indexed bonds. 
These expectations fell down significantly one month after the first 
announcement of the target for 1992. At the end of the year, the 
annual rate of inflation reduced to 9.4 percent, which was lower than 
the target. That enhanced the central bank credibility. The reasons for 
such a relatively low rate of inflation would be the tightening of fiscal 
policy (the budget deficit decreased from 7 percent to 3.5 percent of 
GDP); the reduction in labor costs per unit of output with the 
increased labor supply because of the immigration (increase in 
output); increase in imports by the decreasing import prices parallel to 
world prices and lastly tightening monetary policy in late 1991 
affecting aggregate demand and inflation.  
In November 1992, the 10 percent inflation target was 
announced with 8 percent crawl rate for 1993. Even these rates were 
suitable after the good performance of the previous year, the inflation 
rate for 1993 realized as 11.2 percent slightly above the target. 
Actually, in May-June period of 1993, it has declined to 3 percent 
from 17 percent. The main reasons for this rapid decline would be the 
effect of the nominal exchange rate depreciation due to the sudden 
increase in capital outflows toward the end of 1992. Another reason is 
the seasonal effect of summer months to prices.  
The low rates of inflation in the first half of 1993 encouraged the 
authorities to announce inflation target of 8 percent and crawl rate of 
6 percent for 1994 in July 1993.  But, inflation reached to double-digit 
rates as of mid 1993 and the 1994 target was overshot by 6.5 
percent. The authorities, aiming to reduce the high rate of 
unemployment, decreased the monetary auction interest rate 3   29
percentage points from 12 percent in June to 9 percent in July with 
the 23 percent growth in M1 during the second half of 1993. The 
motivation of this behavior came from that they taught the low 
inflation rates would be permanent and there were no speculative 
attacks in the foreign exchange market.  So, the augmented demand 
for liquid assets by the increased activity in real and financial sector at 
a lower level of interest rate brought asset price inflation. Also, the 
rise in real wages of public sector employees caused the inflation rate 
to increase.  
Bank of Israel decided to raise by a half point its monetary 
auction rates in November and December 1993 against the 
increasing inflation rates. With these reactions inflation expectations 
fell. But from May 1994, increasing interest rates didn’t help to 
decrease the inflation expectations because the authorities reacted in 
a backward looking manner that is, after the inflation rates rose. So, 
at the end of the year expectations and the effective central bank 
overnight interest rate were about 15.5 percent and 18.5 percent 
respectively. 
The central bank and the Finance Ministry set the targets for 
1992 and 1993 but after the overshot of 1994, the government’s 
behavior became more important and the government took some 
decisions: 
1)  Setting nominal budget ceilings. 
2)  A committee of Cabinet ministers to facilitate 
residential construction so diminishing asset price inflation.  
3)  Free imports of fresh agricultural products in case 
shortage in domestic market   30
4)  Adopting foreign product standards to increase 
imports. 
For the year 1995, the inflation target set as a range from 8 
percent to 11 percent and the crawl rate widened to 14 percent by the 
government and the Bank of Israel. The fiscal deficit target for that 
year was 2.75 percent of GDP, exclusive of interest payments on the 
government debt. Even the inflation target was achieved, fiscal deficit 
overshot and realized as 3.2 percent of GDP. 
The target of range from 8 percent to 10 percent for 1996 was 
overshot only by 0.6 percent. But the fiscal deficit missed its target of 
2.5 percent by 2.1 percentage points. Accordingly unemployment fell 
to 6.7 percent and current account deficit increased as the shekel 
depreciated more slowly than expected so that the inflation 
expectations rose to 15 percent in July 1996. The increase in interest 
rates slowed the economic growth and the target overshot stayed at 
0.6 percent.  
The authorities thinking that the fiscal policy would be a threat 
for lower rates of inflation in 1997, decided to announce a target 
range from 7 percent to 10 percent for that year. Also, with the 
inflation-targeting regime, higher inflation rate than the previous year 
couldn’t be announced.  In 1997 exchange rate band widened to 18 
percent showing that it was loosing its significance. This year was 
successful; the target achieved and fiscal deficit was under its target 
of 2.8 percent. 
Because of the recession brought by the disinflation, 
unemployment raised in 1997 so the target has unchanged for 1998 
and it was announced in August 1997. Until September 1998, inflation 
rate stayed around 4.7 percent but with the world financial   31
developments and its implications for the shekel depreciation during 
September-November, it has increased and reached to 8.6 percent in 
annual terms. The Inflation Report was first published in March 1998, 
before that, every three months the Bank of Israel published ‘Recent 
Economic Developments’ of ten pages. 
In the whole of 1999, prices rose at a cumulative rate of 1.3 per
cent. Although this is  
significantly below the 1999 inflation target of 4 percent, it does not in
dicate that the  
inflation environment has fallen to the level, 
which is the norm in industrialized  
countries. 
The economy’s return in the second half of 1999 to an inflation 
path similar to that  
prevailing prior to the world financial crisis, and the inflation target of 3
 to 4 percent  
per year for the next two years set by the government, provide an opp
ortunity to  
consolidate inflation at a level approaching the norm in industrialized 
countries.  
Nevertheless, there are factors present that may still endanger price s
tability, so  
that a cautious monetary policy will be necessary in 2000, too.  (The 
Israel’s Inflation Report July-December 1999) 
In the first half of 2000 the CPI raised by 0.4 percent, an annual 
rate of 0.8 percent -below the 3-4 percent inflation target for 2000 and 
2001; after declining in each month of 2000:I and rising in each month 
of 2000:II. This low rate, however, was influenced by the 3.2 percent 
appreciation of the NIS against the currency basket as a result of   32
large capital inflows from nonresidents as well as by seasonal factors. 
On the basis of inflation expectations derived from the capital market 
and various assessments of future inflation, the annual inflation rate is 
expected to raise to 3-4 percent in the second half of 2000 and in 
2001. 
In light of the current inflation rate, it is important for the 
government to decide that long-term inflation should be within 1-3 
percent range-to be defined as price stability in Israel, too-for 2002 
and subsequent years. (The Israel’s Inflation Report January-June 
2000) 
Israeli inflation targeting is a successful experience except the 
overshot years: 1994, first half of 1996 and last third of 1998. Even 
the exchange rate band is effective in the disinflation period; it has 
some disadvantages with the inflation-targeting regime. If targets for 
the exchange rate band and for the inflation rate are set jointly, the 
interest rate, the instrument of the central bank to achieve the inflation 
target, will be higher than the interest rate to achieve the exchange 
rate band target. So, there will be relatively high domestic real interest 
rate. This will cause capital inflows and appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. And then, the quasi-fiscal cost of the sterilization of 
foreign exchange market intervention will arise. In such a situation the 
exchange rate channel of the monetary policy will not be effective 
against the inflation.  
Giving priority to the inflation target, Israeli authorities widened 
the exchange rate band gradually but this didn’t cause loss of 
credibility. This shows that the credibility is related to the measures 
taken by the authorities in case deviation from the target is foreseen. 
And during the overshot periods, even the exchange rate target was   33
on the way; central bank tightened its monetary policy and increased 
the interest rates consistent with the inflation target. 
One of the factors threatening the target achievement is the 
fiscal expansion by increasing real wages and public expenditures 
when the absence of fiscal dominance is ensured. This is the case 
that Israel experienced in 1994 and 1996. 
III.2 Poland’s Experience 
In nowadays; one of the countries that execute inflation 
targeting monetary framework is Poland. Direct inflation targeting 
(DIT) monetary policy has been in progressed since 1998. In 1998 
the monetary policy was carried out in new institutional conditions. 
According to the Constitution that became into force on 17 October 
1997 and the Act on the National Bank of Poland (NBP) the Monetary 
Policy Council (MPC) was established. The Council consists of the 
President of NBP and 9 other members appointed in equal numbers 
by the President of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm (lower chamber) 
and the Senate (upper chamber) of the Parliament. The MPC 
accepted to implement the assumptions of monetary policy for 1998 
and determined a new direct target of the monetary policy. The MPC 
decided to implement inflation targeting monetary policy. In that 
framework, inflation was defined as the consumer price index. The 
making transparent monetary policy and convincing the public opinion 
about the central bank determination in achieving the declared 
inflation target is a crucial issue within this strategy. Therefore, MPC 
prepared the "medium term strategy of the monetary policy for the 
1999-2003 years" to eliminate uncertainties and increase the 
transparency of monetary policy. Medium term of objective of NBP is 
lowering inflation below 4 percentages till the 2003. MPC also 
announced that specific monetary policy targets for any given year   34
shall be presented in monetary policy guidelines each preceding 
September for the coming year and the council determines the 
monetary policy guidelines for each year and on their basis it 
formulates decisions concerning the central bank key policy 
instruments which are interest rates, open market operations, NBP 
loan and credit facilities and the exchange rate policy. As declared in 
the inflation reports of NBP, reliability of the monetary policy depends 
in a large extent on the level of public awareness of the monetary 
policy objectives, of their structure, of methods of achieving these 
goals by the central bank, of interpretation of the economic 
conditions, of its reaction to unexpected shocks and this reliability 
allows then to reduce uncertainties of economy. 
Inflation target for 1998 passed by the MPC, assuming that the 
level of consumer prices at the end of 1998 compared with the end of 
1997 will not be higher than 9.5 percentage, was carried out by the 
central bank. Inflation measured from December to December was on 
the level of 8.6 percentages. Disciplined budget policy and monetary 
policy were the reasons of that desirable outcome. 
When we analyze history of economic developments in 
Poland's economy, we can observe many positive and desirable 
changes. As we know Poland started an ambitious program of 
economic transformation approximately 10 years ago and so Poland 
is now one of the most successful economies in his region. This 
success is now being supported by new monetary regime to get lower 
inflation rates. The success of Poland's economic transformation 
depends on a well-designed combination of sound financial policy 
perseverance with structural reforms. In the last years Poland's 
economy reached 6 and 7 percent growth rates, inflation declined and 
so living standards of residents increased. (Graph IV) That   35
performance of the economy owed to dynamism of the private sector 
not bloated state owned enterprises. Deregulation and privatization 
enabled to create a dynamic private sector. Foreign investments in 
the country are another reason of that remarkable performance of the 
Poland's economy. They initially produced for domestic market by 
utilizing labor-intensive sectors and then they started to produce for 
export markets of Poland. 
The constitution of the Republic of Poland brought in some 
provisions essential for operation of the NBP and for execution of the 
monetary policy. First of all it increased the scope of decisional and 
instrumental independence of the central bank, hence it raised the 
degree of autonomy. Article 277 of the Constitution, devoted entirely 
to the central bank, defines generally the goal of the NBP activity, 
declaring that NBP is responsible for the value of Polish currency. 
The Constitution also banned monetization of budget deficits. The Act 
on the NBP also specified that the primary target of NBP activities is 
to maintain a stable price level at simultaneous support for the 
economic policy of the Government provided, however, that it doesn't 
constrain the execution of the primary target of NBP. The Act also 
determined selection process of the governor board of NBP.  
After the completion of these constitutional tasks, NBP allowed 
to commence the work of strategic nature. As a result the MPC 
updated on 22 April the existing assumptions of monetary policy for 
1998 prepared by the NBP Management Board in September 1997 
and adopted by the NBP Management Board and the President of 
NBP in accordance with the provision of the Constitution in October 
1997. The updated assumptions maintained the hitherto level of NBP 
inflation target for 1998, declaring that "average annual rate of 
increase of consumer prices should not exceed 11 percent in 1998   36
and the level of prices at the end of that year compared with the end 
of 1997 should not be higher than 9.5 percent." At the meeting in the 
beginning of June 1998 the MPC defined the target of monetary 
policy for 1999. It constituted the basis for the work on assumptions of 
monetary policy for 1999. At the same time the Council determined 
that in September 1998 the medium term strategy of the monetary 
policy for 1999-2003 should be published. It was decided that the 
main medium term target of the monetary policy would consist in 
reduction of annual inflation pace to the level below 4 percent by the 
end of 2003. Short-term inflation targets, announced in annual 
assumptions of the monetary policy, shall be subordinated to this 
medium term target. The Council recognized that the formation of 
instruments of monetary policy subordinate to carrying out the direct 
inflationary target would be the basic principle of the monetary policy 
in the period covered by the strategy. 
The strategy of direct inflationary target (DIT) assumes, as its 
name suggests, the lack of indirect targets (money supply, exchange 
rate). Without focusing on a particular indicator, the central bank 
takes into account all available information about factors increasing or 
decreasing inflationary pressure and causing a rise or fall of 
probability of achieving the inflation target assumed in the given 
period. The basic principle of such a system is that the central bank 
reacts when the forecast inflation value deviates from the level 
assumed as the target. To carry out this strategy in an effective way 
the central bank must have a sufficient recognition of factors affecting 
the inflation, the strength of their relationships and occurring delays. 
The conditions that currently exist in Poland are not perfect for 
carrying out the monetary policy based upon the principle of the direct 
inflation target because of shortages of statistical base in Poland and   37
changes in structure of the economy. Therefore, within the new 
strategy the short-term targets are adopted in sufficiently wide bands 
to increase the probability of execution of these targets even in the 
case of certain mistakes in appraisal of the strength and direction of 
development of factors affecting the price index adopted as the 
target. So, problems connected with the process of transmission of 
impulses from the monetary policy to the economy constitute another 
factor hindering the use of the direct inflation target strategy in 
Poland. 
Another condition may hinder the execution of the DIT strategy 
consists in the insufficiently restrictive fiscal policy. Excess demand 
created by the public sector may lead to worsening the external 
balance and then also inflation in specified conditions the monetary 
policy counteracting these pressures may be ineffective. 
Despite these difficulties the MPC believes that the DIT strategy 
is the most appropriate system of the monetary policy execution in 
the current conditions. But the most important cost of this strategy 
may be rigid inflationary expectations. Therefore, higher transparency 
level should be ensured. In that framework, aiming at increasing the 
transparency of the principles of the monetary policy and thus 
increasing its trustworthiness, in the second half of September 1998 
the MPC prepared the document "The medium-term strategy of the 
monetary policy (1999-2003)" which defines the system and the basic 
directions of the monetary policy in Poland in the period preceding the 
access of our country to the European Union. The strategy mentioned 
also the issue of the monetary policy instruments and drew the 
exchange rate policy scenario, which aims at gradual floating of the 
zloty rate. 
   38
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Source: IFS 
The Council has decided that the medium-term target of 
monetary policy will be to reduce inflation to below 4 percent by the 
year 2003. Inflation targets for the period covered by the Strategy and 
the assessment of their implementation will focus on the Consumer 
Price Index, despite the fact that many countries apply the so-called 
“core inflation” index. As it is known, core inflation is a more accurate 
measure of structural changes in the economy’s price level since it 
excludes effects of seasonal variations, administrative regulations 
and temporary supply shocks. Therefore, NBP has started the 
preparatory work for calculating the core inflation index and it has 
applied it to the Central Statistical Office for the database required for 
that purpose. Despite the choice of CPI, NBP declared the impact of 
external factors not affecting core inflation will be commented in detail 
and the comments will be presented when specific policy decisions 
will seem to be inconsistent, at first sight, with the direction of the 
discrepancy between the inflationary target and the observed and/or 
the forecasted CPI level. 
The main analytical document for the Council will be the 
Inflation Report. The Report will initially be published semi-annually   39
and, in the future, on a quarterly basis. Under the terms of the 
National Bank of Poland Act, the Court & Economic Monitor will 
publish information about the voting by each Council member. 
The Council has decided to set the 1999 target in the range of 8 
percent to 8.5 percent. In March 1999, the Central Bank was lowered 
the target range from 6.6 percent to 7.8 percent because of 
unexpected disinflation. In the first half of 1999 the rate of CPI growth 
declined to 6.5 percent in June, down from 8.6 percent in December 
1998. In the third quarter of 1999, a surge in inflation rate was seen. It 
became 7.8 percent but it was set by the MPC at 6.6 percent. The 
marked acceleration in price growth seen in the third quarter was 
primarily attributable to strong, hard to predict supply shocks. 
Macroeconomics developments in the second and third quarters of 
1999 indicate that fiscal and monetary policies created a favorable 
environment for the unfolding of inflationary processes triggered by 
supply shocks. A rapid growth in consumer demand and high public 
sector deficit were the main indicators of excess demand in the 
economy. The CPI was approximately 9.8 percent in the 1999 year 
and so the actual rate exceeded the upper limit of band rate. 
The money supply increased in the first half of the year, in June 
being 7 percent higher than at December end of 1998. The second 
quarter of 1999 witnessed a markedly declining rate of growth in 
personal zloty deposits, both on the first quarter of 1999 year. The 
main factor in money creation during the first half of 1999 was claims 
on nonfinancial sector. Another factor in money creation was foreign 
assets. It contributed about 23 percent to total money creation. 
However in dollar terms it declined. The lowering of foreign assets 
was the result of growing disequilibrium on the current account, 
primarily due to a strong growth in the deficit on merchandise trade.   40
In the first half of the 1999, growth in cash in circulation 
increased faster than previous periods’ rates. One may hypotheses 
that this resulted from the declining opportunity cost of keeping 
money in cash rather than in bank deposit. 
During these events, the Council believed that the mechanism 
of zloty devaluation was one of the main inflation drivers. Recognizing 
that the zloty devaluation is to some extent necessary to ensure a 
sufficient competitiveness of Polish exports and to restrain excessive 
imports, it was declared that its rate should be lower as soon as 
possible. 
The MPC declared that maintaining the positive trends requires 
a continuation of the restrictive budget policy. The Council announced 
that in the case of worsening of the macroeconomic situation or of 
reducing the degree of the restrictiveness of the budget policy the 
MPC would be ready to aggravate the monetary policy again. 
The conditions for implementing monetary policy differed from 
those of 1998 and capital inflow was low in the first half of 1999. So 
the level of gross official reserves stabilized. Moreover, the volatility of 
the zloty rate of exchange increased pushing up exchange rate risk 
and dampening the interest of short-term capital in securities 
investment. In order to increase exchange rate flexibility, the foreign 
exchange fixing changed its character as from June 7. From now on 
the fixing is no longer used to carry out transactions with the central 
bank, but only to establish the rate of exchange at given time. 
There was one change of base interest rates in the first half 
year in order to realign them with the inflationary target. Actually it 
was deeper than those made so far, so market participants would not   41
be waiting a few more months for further interest rate changes, and 
the market relatively stabilized for some months to come. 
In sum, we think although Poland’s economic situation seems 
remarkable, it is too early to judge whether DIT is successful or not. 
As mentioned in the OECD’s Economic Survey of Poland, there are 
two challenges to that remarkable economic performance. The first is 
keeping inflation under control. In the last years monetary policy was 
successfully implemented to eliminate inflation. Timely actions of 
monetary policy helped to establish the credibility of the Monetary 
Policy Council and National Bank of Poland. But, sudden acceleration 
of the CPI above the inflation objective established for December 
1999 may harm gained credibility of relevant institutions. The Council 
has decided to set the 1999 target in the range of 8 percent to 8.5 
percent. But it was approximately 9.8 percent in the relevant year. 
Inflation targeting monetary policy may eliminate backward looking 
wage indexation in Poland. This may help set wages on the basis of 
future rather than past inflation and so may decrease effects 
inflationary inertia in the Poland’s economy. The second challenge is 
large current account deficits in the economy. Although there is no 
specific level of current account deficit that is unsustainable, a larger 
deficit means higher risk of occurrence of unexpected events in the 
economy. Thus policy makers in the economy should follow 
appropriate macroeconomic and structural policies. 
At the public finance side of economy, there are positive 
developments for the 2000-year. The Budget Law for 2000 sets a 
general government budget deficit of 2.75 percent of GDP. Therefore, 
the budget deficit will be decreased in the year 2000. Despite that 
positive development, there are many current budgetary difficulties 
such as accumulation of arrears by state enterprises on social   42
security contributions and taxes that can be seen as disguised form of 
subsidy, tax reform needs to be implemented to assure a revenue 
base that is consistent with the budget assumptions and budgetary 
system need more transparency and more discipline over the extra-
budgetary funds. (Graph V) 
GRAPH V: 
PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS IN POLAND 
Source: IFS 
III.3 Chilean Experience 
In September 1990, the Central Bank of Chile decided to 
announce an inflation target for the year 1991 after the oil price shock 
due to the 1990 Gulf War and expansionary policies in 1989 causing 
high rates of inflation. Through the new central bank legislation in 
1989, the Central Bank gained its independence and the price 
stability is indicated as its primary goal in the legislation. In addition, 
due largely to measures taken in the aftermath of its severe crisis in 
the early 1980s, Chile’s standards and practices in the areas of 
banking regulation and supervision were of a quality comparable to 
those found in industrialized countries. (Mishkin (2000))  
The main reason of the implementation of an IT regime in Chile 












































according to the targeted inflation rates instead of the backward 
indexation which is very common in this country. So, the cost of the 
disinflationary process would reduce. 
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Between the years 1991 and 1999, annual inflation targets are 
set. In 1994 the central bank started to announce point targets rather 
than target bands and in 1999 a multi year target was first 
announced: 3.5 percent for 2000 and 2 to 4 percent for 2001 
onwards. The monetary authorities did not indicate any escape 
clauses or exemptions, in order to provide credibility they announced 
that any deviations from the target would occur.      
Starting from levels around 25 percent, inflation has fallen to 
levels below 5 percent (3 percent in 1999) (Graph VI).  Except for 
Israel, the initial rate of inflation is higher than other IT implementing 
countries.  Regarding the output growth, the Chilean inflation 
targeting is also successful. Chile has grown at high rates until 1998 
(Graph VII). However, after the Asian and Russian crisis, with a 
wrong decision, the central bank raised interest rates and narrowed   44
the exchange rate band, as a result the economy entered a recession 
undershooting the inflation target.   
GRAPH VII: 
GROWTH RATES OF CHILE 
 
Source: IFS 
From 1985 to August 1999, Chile had experienced an 
exchange rate band regime around a crawling peg (Graph VIII). The 
rate of the crawl determined equal to the one period lagged rate of 
inflation in Chile. The Chilean central bank put explicitly the main goal 
of the exchange rate band implementation. The bank desired to 
maintain the real exchange rate consistent external equilibrium by 
setting the rate of crawl on a backward-looking manner, so it was not 
a disinflationary instrument. However, the central bank showed 
clearly by its actions that the achievement of the inflation target was 
its overriding objective.
14  
                                                 
14 Even in case of large capital inflows the bank widened the band without changing 



































































































Central bank independence, sound financial system and fiscal 
stability are the main conditions to implement an IT regime. When we 
look at the Chilean case, it can be seen that the budget surplus was 
around 2.8 percent of GDP on average between the years 1991 and 
1997. Furthermore, the financial institutions became strong as a 
result of measures taken after the banking crisis in 1980s. This 
allowed the central bank to use its instruments efficiently to defend 
the currency and the banks; hence the speculative attacks against the 
peso are prevented.  
The Chilean experience shows that an IT regime can be 
successful to attain permanent low rates of inflation even the initial 
inflation rate is more than 20 percent. In addition, it confirms that the 
foundation of a strong fiscal balance and a sound financial system are 
as important as the central bank independence whose primary goal is 
price stability.    
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CONCLUSION: 
The unsuccessful results of the pegged exchange rate regimes 
in Latin America and East Asia countries has led developing countries 
to search for alternative nominal anchors. At this stage, IT regime, 
which has been used by some developing countries in the last ten 
years, become an attractive alternative for the developing countries.  
In this paper, it is attempted to explain the properties of IT 
framework and the prerequisites for its implementation. We indicate 
these prerequisites as high degree of independence of the monetary 
policy, freedom of fiscal dominance, and absence of any firm 
commitment to particular levels of variables like exchange rate. As it 
is cited in the paper, many developing countries do not satisfy these 
two conditions. Moreover, most of them do not have powerful models, 
which explain the dynamics of the economy very well and which gives 
successful inflation forecasts.  
It is claimed by some that the main obstacle to the adoption of 
IT framework lies not so much on the countries inability to conduct an 
independent monetary policy, as on their tendency to overburden 
monetary policy with multiple and potentially competing objectives 
(See Masson etc. 1997). 
It might be claimed that it is too early for some developing 
countries to implement IT regime in order to improve monetary and 
inflation performance of these countries, although the country cases 
examined here showed us that IT regime could also have successful 
results in the developing countries. The main reason behind this 
success may be various. In the Chilean case, the reason behind this 
success can be the absence of fiscal deficits, the rigorous regulations 
and supervision of financial system and gradual hardening of the   47
targets. In Israel experience, the success is directly related to the 
credibility gained by preemptive actions taken by the authorities in 
case a deviation from the target is foreseen. In Poland case, although 
IT seems on track with considerable change of economic situation, it 
is early to make a judgment about its success. 
Finally, it can be said that although IT is not very suitable 
framework for some developing countries, it can be highly useful 
policy for a number of them.  
ANNEX 1: 
According to Debelle (1999), the role of output stabilization in 
inflation targeting can be examined by following simple model: 
Π  = Π t-1+α (yt-1-y*t-1)+ ε t  → Phillips curve 
yt = y*t+β (yt-1-y*t-1)-γ (rt-1-r*)+η   → Aggregate demand curve 
L = Ε t ∑t=0
∞ δ
s-t [(1-λ )(Π s-Π *)
 2+λ (ys-y*s)
 2]  → The central bank’s 
loss function  
The central banker’s objective is to minimize the loss function, 
which is the weighted average of deviation of inflation and output from 
their targets, by using their policy instruments (real interest rates). 
These formulas shows that interest rates affect output with one period 
lag, inflation with to period lags. 
According to the weights chosen above, inflation targeting 
monetary policy takes different shapes. When the coefficient of λ  is 
chosen as being equal to zero, it means that the only objective of the 
central bank is to create low and stable inflation. Central Bank does 
not consider the movements in the other macroeconomic variables 
like income growth etc. This regime is called as strict inflation 
targeting regime. When it is chosen as being greater than zero, it   48
means that, the central bankers will not allow big fluctuations in 
output and will try to achieve its target in a longer horizon. This 
regime is called as flexible inflation targeting regime. 
When the central banks make the decision about the value of λ , 
it should be known that this choice would affect the speed with which 
the central banks gains credibility. In the first days of the policy 
application, it would be better to choose the value of the coefficient 
low to show the decisiveness of the bank in the fight with inflation. As 
a result of the increase in the credibility, the structure of the economy 
and inflation may change. As the credibility is gained in the later 
phase of the application, the policy might be made more flexible to 
responds shocks hitting the economy. 
From above equations the reaction function of the central banks 
can be shown as 
rt = r*+σ 1 (Π t-Π *)+σ 2(yt-y*t) 
In case of the positive demand shock (η >0) the type of policy 
response will depends on the coefficient of λ . When λ =0, the optimal 
policy is to choice the policy instruments so that the inflation be equal 
to the target rate in two periods time. However, even when λ =0, the 
output is still in the reaction function of the central bank due to its 
information content. When λ >0, the monetary policy responds to 
shocks so that the gap between the actual and the targeted inflation 
rate is closed on a longer horizon. The degree to which the emphasis 
is given to the output, the value of λ , also determines length of the 
horizon to reach to the target. The more weight given to output, the 
longer time to reach the target is necessitated. However, this also 
causes a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. As the weight on   49
output increases, the variability on output decreases while that of 
inflation increases. 
In case of the demand shock, the trade-off between output and 
inflation variability arises because there are different lags between the 
effects of interests on inflation and output. In the first period, the 
interest rate change display its influences on the output and then in 
the second period, the change in the output affects the inflation. 
However, in case of the supply shock (ε >0), the lag structure is not 
important. In order to decrease the inflation, an output gap is needed. 
The higher the output gap, the lower the inflation variability and the 
higher the output variability. 
The above trade-off can be seen more clearly when a faster 
transmission mechanism is assumed. Assume that the change in the 
short-term interest rates have some immediate impacts on the 
exchange rate. So, the change in exchange rate affects CPI directly 
and indirectly by means of the exchange rate channels. When the 
bias from the targeted inflation rate is realized, a large the interest 
rate movement is needed to change the exchange rate to reach the 
target. 
The central banks avoid generally inflation variability, because: 
1)  The increase in the inflation variability results in a 
decrease in the credibility of the policy, which in turn increases the 
inflation expectations and this makes disinflation process more costly. 
2)  There is a positive relationship between the inflation 
variability and inflation rates. 
3)  An increase in the inflation variability increases the 
cost of signing the long-term contracts by decreasing the predictability   50
of the future prices (price level target would decrease these costs 
even further than inflation target). 
4)  According to Debelle and Fischer (1994) there is 
positive relationship between output and inflation variability.  
In order to decrease the variability, a policy rule that includes 
the variables, which have influence on inflation and output, like 
exchange rate or unit labor costs may be included in the objective 
function of central bank. Alternatively, it is also possible to include the 
forecast of inflation and output. In this situation, the policy takes into 
account the policy lags and the policy has forward-looking manner. 
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